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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and John E. Duvall*
Perhaps the most significant cases during the 2014 survey period were
those that were not handed down by United States Supreme Court,
rather than the cases that were decided.' Easily the most talked about
case during the survey period was the case pending before the Supreme
Court, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,2 in which the Court will
decide whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 3 requires employers
to offer work place accommodations to pregnant employees in order to
remain on the job. Another high profile case is Mach Mining, LLC v.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,' in which the Supreme
Court will decide whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) statutorily required efforts to engage in conciliation before
taking employers to court is subject to judicial review. However,

* Partner in the firm of FordHarrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. University of Virginia
(B.A., 1970); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1975).
Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Partner in the firm of FordHarrison LL, Jacksonville, Florida. Florida State
University (B.S., 1973); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1985). Member, State Bar of Florida.
This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law decided
by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit during 2014. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§621-634
(2012); the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1871, 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983 (2012); Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); and the
American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§12101-12213 (2012).
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit employment discrimination law during the prior
survey period, see Peter Reed Corbin & John E. Duvall, Employment Discrimination,65
MERCER L. REV. 909 (2014).

2. 134 S. Ct. 2898 (2014). The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Young on
March 25, 2015. See 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k) (2012).
4. 134 S. Ct. 2872 (2014). The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Mach on
April 29, 2015. See 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).

927

MERCER LAW REVIEW

928

[Vol. 66

treatment of the decisions in Young and Mach Mining will have to await
the 2015 survey article because 2014 came to an end with the cases still
pending before the Supreme Court.
That is not to say that the Supreme Court or the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit were not busy during the 2014
survey period. Indeed they were. Many decisions were handed down.
However, the vast majority of Eleventh Circuit cases were unpublished
decisions, and the majority of those decisions affirmed summary
judgments in favor of employers. The number of these decisions again
raises the question of why there continues to be so many appeals in this
area in the face of well-established precedent. Selected highlights from
these cases are summarized below.
I.

TITLE VII OF THE CML RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

Coverage under the Act - the Definition of Employer
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Mastro v. Seminole Tribe of
Florida5 is not that significant, but it is mentioned because it involved
an issue that simply does not arise very often. The plaintiff worked as
a car dealer at the Seminole Indian Casino in Immokalee, Florida.' In
response to the plaintiff's lawsuit alleging gender discrimination and
retaliation pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 and the
Florida Civil Rights Act,8 the district court granted the tribe's motion
to dismiss, finding that the tribe and casino were entitled to tribal
immunity.' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, but
did not reach the immunity question.1 ° Instead, the Eleventh Circuit
relied upon the language of Section 701(b) of Title VII, recognizing that
"Congress chose to expressly exempt Indian tribes from Title VII's
definition of 'employer.'" 1
A.

Disparate Treatment
In Galdamez v. DHL Air Express USA," the Eleventh Circuit
underscored how difficult it can be for a plaintiff to establish a
"comparator" for purposes of a Title VII prima facie case, i.e., a
B.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

578 F. App'x 801 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 802.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.1 (West 2010).
Mastro, 578 F. App'x at 802.

10. Id. at 802-03.
11. Id. at 803; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(b).
12.

578 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir. 2014).
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"similarly situated" employee not in the plaintiff's protected category
who received more favorable treatment for similar workplace infractions. 3 The plaintiff worked for DHL, a global air freight company, at
the Miami International Airport. Her job as an international service
agent was physically demanding and involved lifting heavy objects. The
plaintiff injured her knee on the job and requested a light-duty
assignment. However, her request was denied by DHL. The plaintiff
brought suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging gender discrimination. The
On
district court granted summary judgment for the employer. 4
not
the
plaintiff
had
that
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing
established a prima facie case because the plaintiff had not shown that
"DHL's employment policies were applied less favorably to her than to
a similarly situated male employee, i.e., a comparator."15 Even though
the plaintiff argued that two male employees who had received lightduty assignments were valid comparators, the court of appeals rejected
this argument because the male employees had different supervisors
than the plaintiff and worked in different circumstances.16
An alternative to the comparator method of establishing a prima facie
case under Title VII is the method of presenting a "convincing mosaic"
of circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that
the defendant acted with discriminatory intent."7 This is exactly the
method that was relied upon by the plaintiff in Smith v. City of New
Smyrna Beach. 8 The plaintiff worked as a firefighter and paramedic
for the City of New Smyrna Beach. During her initial job interview in
2003, the city's Fire Chief told the plaintiff that he usually "only really
hire[d] men that hunt, fish, or camp" but that he had heard the plaintiff
was "a pretty good ballplayer." After the plaintiff was hired, the only
other woman working for the fire department, a lieutenant who became
the plaintiff's mentor, advised her to "[kleep your head down and your
mouth shut." Soon after the plaintiff was hired, one of the three male
battalion chiefs told the plaintiff that he did not believe women should
be in the fire service. Another male lieutenant commented toward the
plaintiff, "We [don't] need another split-tail here." The plaintiff
experienced similar comments throughout her employment until her
termination in 2008. The plaintiff brought a gender discrimination
action pursuant to Title VII. Following a six-day jury trial, the jury

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 891-92.
Id. at 889.
Id. at 891, 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 892.
See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011).
588 F. App'x 965 (11th Cir. 2014).
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ruled for the plaintiff and awarded her $244,000 in loss compensation
and $200,000 for emotional pain and mental anguish.1 9 On appeal, the
city argued that the plaintiff presented insufficent evidence to allow the
jury to infer that the city intentionally discriminated against her on the
basis of her gender, but the Eleventh Circuit had little difficulty in
concluding otherwise. 2 Finding that plantiff had presented evidence
that she "was not allowed to change shifts, was denied proper gear, and
was yelled at or disciplined in situations where male firefighters were
not similarly reprimanded," the court of appeals affirmed.21
Hostile Work Environment
Perhaps the most noteworthy Title VII case handed down by the
Eleventh Circuit during the survey period was Adams v. Austal, U.S.A.,
L.L.C. 22 The plaintiffs worked at a shipyard in Mobile, Alabama.
They alleged a racially hostile work environment at the ship yard, and
presented evidence of "vulgar racial graffiti in the men's restroom,
appearances of nooses, displays of Confederate flags, and utterances of
racial slurs."' Over a period of almost ten years, the company had
repeatedly cleaned the graffiti from the restroom walls until, as the court
noted, "it finally wised up and painted the walls black."24 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants in the cases of
thirteen plaintiffs. Two cases went to trial, and in both instances, the
jury ruled for the defendant.' On appeal, the issue before the court of
appeals was whether a plaintiff could rely on evidence of racial
harassment that he was not personally aware of in order to prove his
claim. On this key issue, the Eleventh Circuit stated, "We now hold that
an employee alleging a hostile work environment cannot complain about
conduct of which he was oblivious for the purpose of proving that his
work environment was objectively hostile."2"
In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit joined five other circuits in taking
this position." In applying this holding to the case at hand, the court
of appeals "conclude[d] that seven of the employees presented sufficient
evidence that their work environments were objectively hostile," and
C.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 967-68, 969-73.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 977-78.
754 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1250.
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vacated the district court's award of summary judgment.2" However,
the court affirmed summary judgment in the other six cases, and also
affirmed the two jury verdicts.'
D.

Sexual Harrassment

In Swindle v. Jefferson County Commission,30 the Eleventh Circuit
reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a formal anti-harassment
policy that includes an effective complaint procedure for purposes of
establishing the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense31 in sexual
harrassment cases.3 2 The plaintiff worked for the Jefferson County
Sheriff's Office as a member of the "weight crew." She worked in that
position for approximately three and a half years until she was placed
on administrative leave because of the county's financial problems. Prior
to being placed on administrative leave, the plaintiff filed an internal
complaint of sexual harassment, alleging that her immediate supervisor
and another manager had been sexually harassing her for almost two
years. The alleged conduct involved a variety of incidents of sexual
comments, physical touching, and sexually suggested actions. Following
an investigation by the Sheriff's Office, both of the supervisors were
terminated. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an action pursuant to Title
VII asserting a sexual harassment claim. The district court granted
summary judgment for the Sheriff's Office, finding that the Sheriff had
established the Faragher-Ellerthaffirmative defense.33 On appeal, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed and affirmed the district court's decision.'
Regarding the first prong of the Faragher-Ellerthdefense (that the
employer "exercise[] reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct
harassing behavior"), the court of appeals agreed that the Sheriff Office's
formal anti-harassment policy, which had been openly adopted and
communicated, met this prong.35 Regarding the second prong of the

28. Id. at 1245.
29. Id. at 1245, 1257.

30. 593 F. App'x 919 (11th Cir. 2014).
31. The Faragher-Ellerthaffirmative defense in certain sexual harassment cases was
established by the Supreme Court's decisions in Faragherv. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775 (1998) and Burlington Industries,Inc. v. Ellerth., 524 U.S. 742 (1998). The defense has
two basic elements: "(1) that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) that the ... employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S at 765.
32. See Swindle, 593 F. App'x at 923-24, 929.
33. Id. at 921-22.
34. Id. at 925.
35. Id. at 923-24.
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Faragher-Ellerthdefense (that the plaintiff "unreasonably failed to take
advantage of the employer's preventive and corrective opportunties"), the
Eleventh Circuit agreed that this prong was met as well. 36 Of note to

the court of appeals was the delay by the plaintiff of almost two years
in reporting her first instance of alleged harassment.3 7
Retaliation
In Booth v. Pasco Co., 38 although the plaintiffs brought Title VII
actions against both their county employer and their union, it is the
claim against the union, the International Association of Firefighters
Local 4420, that is worthy of comment. Pasco County, Florida employed
the plaintiffs as emergency workers. After filing internal grievances,
both plaintiffs were transferred to less desirable positions. Believing the
transfers to be retaliatory, the plaintiffs filed complaints of discrimination against both the county and the union with the EEOC and the
Florida Commission on Human Relations. Thereafter, the union
distributed an "update on legal issues," in which it made specific
reference to the discrimination charges brought by the plaintiffs and
noted that the charges were "a frivolous claim with no grounds for
support" but "could be very costly and generate a legal bill of $10,000 or
more."" Following the distribution of its memo, virtually all of the
plaintiffs' co-workers shunned them.
In a subsequent jury trial of the plaintiffs' retaliation claims pursuant
to Title VII, the jury entered a verdict against the union and in favor of
the plaintiffs, awarding each plaintiff $75,000 for emotional pain and
mental anguish and $8,000 in punitive damages.4 ° On appeal, the
union argued that imposing liability against it on the basis of the posted
memo violated its First Amendment right to freedom of speech.4 1 The
court of appeals concluded that the memo posted by the union "contained
both an implicit 'call for reprisal' and also a threat of further retaliation.' 2 Further, the court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs'
filing of EEOC charges "was not a matter of public concern," and
therefore, "the Union's response [also] was not speech on a matter of

E.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 923-25.
Id. at 924.
757 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1200-03.
Id. at 1205-06.
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1212.
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public concern."13 Accordingly, the judgment against the union was affirmed."
F

ProceduralIssues: Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL)

In Connelly v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,4 5 the
primary issue before the court of appeals was whether the district court
properly "entered judgment as a matter of law based on inconsistent jury
verdicts."46 As it turned out, the court of appeals ruled that the
inconsistent verdict did not matter and reversed the district court.4"
The plaintiff, a white male, worked several years for Metropolitan
Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA). However, after the transit
authority hired a black female as the plaintiff's supervisor, things
changed radically. The new supervisor, who referred to herself as a
"mean black bitch," "butted heads from the get-go" with the plaintiff."
She soon determined that plaintiff's services "were no longer needed"
and promptly fired him.4
In the plaintiff's subsequent lawsuit pursuant to Title VII alleging
racial discrimination and retaliation, the jury ruled for the plaintiff on
his claim against the transit authority (awarding him $500,000 in
compensatory damages), but ruled against the plaintiff on his claim
against the supervisor."0 Following the trial, however, the district court
granted the transit authority's motion for judgment as a matter of law,
finding that the verdict in favor of the supervisor also mandated a
judgment in favor of the transit authority.5 ' On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, finding that the "consistency of the jury verdicts was
irrelevant."5 2 According to the court of appeals, in ruling on a motion
for judgment as a matter of law, "only the sufficiency of the evidence
matters."5 3 Finding that there was more than sufficient evidence to
support the jury's verdict against the transit authority, the court
remanded the case to54the district court to reinstate the verdict against
the transit authority.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 1215.
Id. at 1216.
764 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1359-61.
Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1362-63.
Id. at 1363.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 1360.
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Employer Defenses

1. Judicial Estoppel. In Dunn v. Advance Medical Specialties,
Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the availabilty of the judicial
estoppel defense in situations where the plaintiff filed a petition for
bankruptcy but failed to disclose the existence of his or her employment
claim as a potential asset in the bankruptcy filings.56 This case also
underscores the importance on the defendant's part of finding out during
the discovery process whether the plaintiff has filed for bankruptcy.57
The plaintiff, after being terminated from her corporate recruiter
position with the defendant, filed a discrimination action pursuant to
both the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19908 and Title VII. 59
Approximately two months after filing her lawsuit, the plaintiff and her
husband filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy protection but did not
disclose her discrimination lawsuit as a contingent asset in the
bankruptcy filings. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, finding the the plaintiff was judicially estopped from
asserting her discrimination claim because of the failure to disclose the
claim in her bankrupcty petition. 0 The district court also denied the
bankruptcy Trustee's motion to vacate the summary judgment order
1
pursuant to Rule 60(bX4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
rejecting the Trustee's argument that the Trustee was the only entity
with standing to pursue the claim. 2 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit,
relying upon its prior decision in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroflex, Inc. ,63 and
subsequent rulings, affirmed both of the district court's rulings.64
2. After-Acquired Evidence. In Garner v. G. D. Searle Pharmaceuticals Co.,65 the Eleventh Circuit recognized the defense of afteracquired evidence, but unfortunately for the defendant, the court of
appeals found that the defendant waived the right to assert the

55.

556 F. App'x 785 (11th Cir. 2014).

56. Id. at 788.
57. See id.
58.
59.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
Dunn, 556 F. App'x at 787.

60. Id. at 787.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(bX4).
62.

Dunn, 556 F. App'x at 787-88.

63. 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
64.
65.

Dunn, 556 F. App'x at 788, 789.
581 F. App'x 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
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defense." The facts of the case could be a commentary on the inefficiency on the American judicial system. The plaintiff brought a gender
discrimination action pursuant to the Equal Pay Act6 7 and Title VII."
Following a bench trial in 1993, the district court did not issue its
opinion holding the defendant liable until January 2002, for reasons that
are not explained in the court's opinion. Thereafter, it took the district
court more than an additional decade to resolve the issue of damages.
From beginning to end, this relatively simple employment discrimination
suit took almost twenty-three years to reach a resolution. And then, of
course, there was an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit! As part of the
lower court's resolution, the district court limited the plaintiff's back-pay
award based on after-acquired evidence, finding that the plaintiff would
have been discharged even in the absence of the defendant's discrimination because of her falsification of a physician call report.6 9 On appeal,
however, the Eleventh Circuit found that the after-acquired evidence
doctrine was an affirmative defense that the defendant needed to
affirmatively plea.70 The court of appeals noted that the defendant
never amended its answer to assert after-acquired evidence as an
affirmative defense, nor had the defense been raised as an issue in the
pre-trial order. 71 Finding that it would "not countenance such sandbagging," the Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant waived the right to
assert the after-acquired evidence defense and reversed the district
court's limitation on the plaintiff's back-pay award.7 2
H. Remedies; Attorney Fees
The Supreme Court's decision in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central
Pension Fund of the InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers73 is not
an employment discrimination case, but it is briefly mentioned because
of its potential impact on attorney fees disputes in employment
discrimination cases. 74 The underlying litigation was pursuant to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 75 and the
case involved the issue of fringe benefit contributions to a union benefit

66. Id. at 785-86.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
68. Garner,581 F. App'x at 783.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 785.
71. Id. at 785-86.
72. Id. at 786.
73. 134 S. Ct. 773 (2014).
74.

See generally id.

75. 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 (2012).
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fund.76 The issue before the Supreme Court was whether, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, 77 the underlying decision on the merits of the case
was a "final decision."7" In its prior decision in Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson & Co., 79 the Court held that the underlying decision on the
merits was a final, appealable decision for purposes of § 1291 even if the
issue of attorney fees had not yet been determined.8 ° The issue before
the Court in Ray Haluch Gravel Co. was whether the result is any
different if the unresolved claim for attorney fees was based on a
contract rather than a statute.81 The Court held that it made no
difference; the result was the same. 82 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
stated that "[wihether the claim for attorney's fees is based on a statute,
a contract, or both, the pendency of a ruling on an award for fees and
costs does not prevent, as a general rule, the merits judgment from
becoming final for purposes of appeal."'
The lesson to be learned from this case for the employment discrimination practioner is that if you intend to appeal an employment discrimination case, make sure that you file a timely notice of appeal after the
district court renders its decision on the merits, even though, as is
usually the case, the issue of attorney fees and costs (which is generally
a collateral evidentiary proceeding) has not yet been resolved.'
In Lewis v. Haskell Slaughter Young & Rediker, LLC,s the Eleventh
Circuit, in essence, refereed a dispute between a plaintiff and her former
lawyer.6 The plaintiff filed a discrimination action pursuant to Title
VII. During discovery in the case, the plaintiff sent an email to her
former attorney's firm requesting information about the case. The
attorney considered the email to be "derogatory, accusatory, and
demanding," and soon thereafter advised the plaintiff that she would be
withdrawing from the case.87 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff (through
a different counsel) filed a notice of acceptance of an offer of judgment
by the defendant (in the amount of $85,000). On the same day, the

76. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 134 S. Ct. at 777.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012).
78. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 134 S. Ct. at 777. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, only "final
decisions" of a district court may be appealed to a United States Court of Appeals.
79. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
80. Id. at 199-200.
81. Ray Haluch Gravel Co., 134 S. Ct. at 780.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 777.
84. See generally id.
85. 582 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2014).
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 812.
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former attorney filed a motion to withdraw and a notice of attorney's lien
against the judgment. The district court concluded that the former
attorney was entitled to attorney fees in quantum meruit, and awarded
the former attorney $38,250 in attorney fees.' On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under Alabama law, the district court
properly applied the quantum meruit theory, and that the former
attorney had "just cause" to withdraw from the case. 9 However, there
was also a very spirited dissent by District Judge Middlebrook (sitting
by designation).9" According to the dissent, the former attorney's
"unilateral and precipitous withdrawal without consultation with the
client or permission from the tribunal constituted abandonment of the
suit and precludes compensation."9 1 In the authors' opinion, the
dissent got it right.
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT

Only two noteworthy Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA)92 appeals were decided during the survey period. In Crisman
v. FloridaAtlantic University Board of Trustees,93 a panel determined
that the state university boards of trustees in Florida are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity from ADEA claims.94 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that Florida had not consented to such suits against
the university boards by merely stating under their enabling statute an
intention for these entities to sue and be sued.95 "A state waives its
Eleventh Amendment immunity 'only where stated by the most express
language or by such overwhelming implication from the text [of such an
enabling statute] as will leave no room for any other reasonable
construction."'96 Finding that there was no provision of the relevant
Florida law that could be construed to constitute such a waiver, the
court of appeals vacated the district court's finding to the contrary and
remanded the case with instructions to the district court to dismiss the
claim on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.9 7

88. Id.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 815 (Middlebrook, J., dissenting).

Id. at 815.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012).
572 F. App'x 946 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 947 (quoting Port Auth. Trans. Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305

(1990)).

97. Id. at 949.
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The court in Cardell v. Miami Beach Fraternal Order of Police98
affirmed summary judgment in favor of a public employer on an
attempted ADEA claim.99 The dispute in that case arose from the
refusal by the city to permit the over-age- forty plaintiffs to switch from
a five-year deferred retirement option, "DROP-5," after they had
previously enrolled in a three-year version of the program. Arguing that
age was the impermissible factor in the city's decision, the plaintiffs
sued, claiming age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. 00 Affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the city by the district
court, the panel concluded, "Appellants were denied access to the DROP5 not because of their age, but rather because of their pension status." 1 ' The panel determined that the plaintiffs had failed to put
forth any direct or circumstantial evidence supporting their claim of an
102
impermissible motive behind the city's decision.
III.

AMERICANS WiTH DISABILITIES ACT

A.

Americans with DisabilitiesAmendments Act of 2008
Two decisions during the survey period concerned application of the
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 (Amendments
Act) ' °3 to conduct occurring after the amendments became effective.
In the first appeal, Morris v. Sequa Corp.,"°4 summary judgment was
reversed because the district court did not correctly apply the Amendments Act in reaching its ruling.0 5 The Eleventh Circuit determined
that the district court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff's
termination occurred in September of 2008, prior to the effective date of
the amendments.0 6 The panel found that there was a factual dispute
pertaining to the actual date of termination, thereby precluding
summary judgment.'
The Morris panel relied on the earlier panel
ruling during the survey period in Mazzeo v. Color Resolutions International, LLC.0 8 In Mazzeo, another panel determined that the lower

98.

593 F. App'x 849 (11th Cir. 2014).

99. Id. at 900.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 902.
102. Id. at 901-02.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
104. 564 F. App'x 516 (l1th Cir. 2014).
105. Id. at 516-17.
106. Id. at 517. The Amendments Act is applicable to all claims occurring after
January 1, 2009. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
107. Morris, 564 F. App'x at 517.
108. ld; see also 746 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2014).
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court in that case also failed to recognize the changes to the ADA made
by Congress through enactment of the Amendments Act. 10 9 Those
changes included lowering the standard for plaintiffs attempting to show
a substantial limitation on a major life activity." Given the passage
of time since the amendments became effective, there probably will be
no future appeals concerning this issue.
B.

Essential Job Functions
In one of the only officially reported employment decisions rendered
during the survey period, Samson v. Federal Express Corp.,"' a
divided panel concluded that a district court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant." 2 This appeal focused on the factsensitive question of what constitutes an essential job function for ADA
purposes. In the district court, Federal Express Corporation (FedEx)
successfully argued that the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) safety regulations implementing the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Act" 3 obligated the company to mandate successful completion
of a DOT medical examination as a prerequisite to employment for its
truck maintenance technicians." 4 Technicians are required to testdrive commercial motor vehicles as part of their job responsibilities."'
The plaintiff had applied for a technician position in Fort Myers, Florida,
but was unable to obtain the necessary medical certification because he
suffered from a physical limitation that disqualified him from driving
commercial motor vehicles under the DOT safety regulations." 6
While acknowledging that the regulations apply to employers
transporting passengers or cargo in interstate commerce, and that FedEx
is generally subject to those regulations, the Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the district court erred by not focusing on whether the driving
requirement was an essential function of the particular job in Fort
Myers for which Samson applied.'
The panel majority determined
that the proper factual inquiry in the case was whether the limited truck
driving that Samson would actually be required to perform as a
maintenance mechanic technician in Fort Myers constituted transporting

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See Mazzeo, 746 F.3d at 1269-70.
Id. at 1269.
746 F.3d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1198.
49 U.S.C. §§ 31131 to 31137, 31140 to 31144, 31146, 31147 (2012).
Samson, 746 F.3d at 1198-1200.
Id. at 1200.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1201-03.
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property or passengers in interstate commerce as that term is defined
The majority concluded that the DOT
within the regulations.'
regulations did not compel FedEx to require Samson to pass the medical
1 9
examination to be qualified for the Fort Myers technician position.
Consequently, in the opinion of the panel majority, the regulations could
for an essential functions defense for that
not serve as the basis
120
particular position.
The majority additionally found that disputed factual questions
remained to be decided regarding whether FedEx's medical examination
prerequisite was an impermissible qualification standard, because
"reasonable jurors could differ as to whether test-driving FedEx trucks
is an essential function of the technician position." 121 FedEx contended
that because federal regulations automatically disqualified an applicant
from obtaining a commercial driver's license, Samson was incapable of
performing an "essential" job function, namely, test driving its trucks
with or without reasonable accommodation. 2 2 The majority concluded
1 23
that these questions should not have been taken away from the jury.
Opining that test driving was a "miniscule" part of the technician
position in Fort Myers, the majority stated the evidence offered below
showed that "other FedEx Technicians throughout Florida generally testhours per year - an insignificant portion
drive an average of about 3.71 124
of their total time on the job."
FedEx asserted on appeal that the medical examination requirement
was not its choice, but rather was pressed upon it by the DOT through
It further argued that the regulations
the safety regulations.1 25
required "employees who drive in interstate commerce, or who drive
commercial motor vehicles over 26,001 pounds in either interstate or
A
intrastate commerce, to obtain DOT medical certification." 26
majority of the court disagreed, finding the weight restrictions to be
The majority stated, "If the employee's test-driving
irrelevant. 12
constitutes transporting property or passengers in interstate commerce,
the DOT medical examination requirement applies."1 2 ' Here, however,

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1205.
at 1205-06.
at 1202.
at 1203.
at 1202 (emphasis omitted).
at 1203.
at 1205 n.10.
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a witness for Samson testified that he never test-drove any FedEx truck
carrying cargo, much less across the state line, which was "not surprising given that the Fort Myers facility is located near the Florida Gulf
Coast far from any state line[s]. " 129

In his dissent, Judge James C. Hill took issue with the majority's
highly-individualized focus on the particular job at issue rather than on
the general requirements imposed on transportation employers under
the DOT regulations.130 "The majority is misplaced when it bases its
analysis on the individual employee, who may or may not operate
commercial motor vehicles in interstate commerce. The pertinent
regulations apply to employers who operate commercial motor vehicles
in interstate commerce." 3' "[Ilf FedEx were to allow a technician to
operate one of its commercial motor vehicles without a commercial
driver's license and without a valid DOT medical certification, FedEx
could be subject to both criminal and civil liabilities." 32 To illustrate
what he considered to be a fallacy in the majority's reasoning, he
posited, "But tell me, how far north must we go in the State of Florida
for this line to start to blur and the possibility of interstate commercial
travel to become more real?"'33 Nevertheless, the blanket application
of the DOT safety requirements to the Fort Myers maintenance
further factual analysis.1 3" The case was
technician position required
35
reversed and remanded.

Employer Knowledge
In Corzine v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,"' the district court's grant
of summary judgment for the employer was affirmed on appeal because
the employer did not know of the plaintiff's disability until after it
decided to terminate her employment. 3 ' During the final days of her
employment, Corzine was diagnosed with a potential metastatic breast
tumor. She was fired literally on the heels of receiving the news. 3 '
Her claim failed, however, despite the close timing between the events
because she was unable to offer any evidence indicating that anyone
C.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1205.
Id. at 1206 (Hill, J., dissenting).
Id. (empasis omitted).
Id. at 1206 n.1.
Id. at 1206.
Id. at 1206 (majority).
Id.
589 F. App'x 482 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 483.
Id.
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responsible for or participating in the employment decision to terminate
her employment knew of her recent medical diagnosis.139
D.

Accommodations

Not surprisingly, a number of cases reported during the survey period
concerned an employer's duty to accommodate individuals with
disabilities. One of the major objectives of the Amendments Act was to
shift employment inquiries away from the question of whether a
particular applicant or employee is disabled for purposes of the ADA to
the individualized inquiry of whether the individual can perform the
essential functions of a particular job with or without reasonable
accommodation." 4 In McCarroll v. Somerby of Mobile, LLC,"' a
plaintiff's attempted-failure-to-accommodate claim proved unsuccessful
in both the trial and the appellate courts because she was unable to
demonstrate that she sought an accommodation until after the decision
to terminate her employment had been reached.142
Perhaps the most popularly reported ADA accommodation decision
rendered by the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period came in
Jarvela v. Crete CarrierCorp.143 In that case, another appeal involving interpretation of the DOT truck driver safety regulations, a panel
concluded that a trucking company did not violate the ADA when it fired
an alcoholic driver in reliance on the company's interpretation of its
obligations under the regulations.'" Acknowledging that transportation employers must determine who is qualified to drive a commercial
motor vehicle under the DOT regulations, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for the employer. 4" Crete Carrier Corporation
(Crete) determined that a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism meant
that a truck driver cannot be permitted to drive commercial vehicles
under its interpretation of the DOT regulations. Crete successfully
argued that the plaintiff's job description stated that an essential job
duty was that the employee qualify as a commercial driver pursuant to
the DOT regulations and company policy, which prohibits Crete from
employing anyone who has a diagnosis of alcoholism within the past five
years. Since the regulations place the onus on the employer to make

139. Id.
140. See Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
141. No. 14-11040, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23356 (11th Cir. Dec. 12, 2014).
142. Id. at *7, *8.
143. 754 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2014), overuled by Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp., 776
F.3d 822 (11th Cir. 2015).
144. Jarvela, 776 F.3d at 831.
145. Id.
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sure each employee is qualified to drive a commercial vehicle, Crete
argued that the employer must determine whether someone suffers from
a current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. 146 The court of appeals found
Crete's interpretation of the regulations to be reasonable.147
E. ConditionalJob Offers
Wetherbee v. Southern Co.,"' another officially reported decision,
49
concerned the proper application of the business-necessity defense.
In the litigation's second trip to the court of appeals, the district court's
grant of summary judgment for Southern Company was affirmed on
other grounds. 50 Wetherbee sued Southern Company in 2008, claiming
that it unlawfully discriminated against him when it refused to hire him
to work at one of its nuclear power plants based upon information
obtained during a required pre-hire medical evaluation. Wetherbee
applied for a systems engineer position, and Southern Company
extended to him a conditional offer of employment contingent upon his
satisfactory completion of a standard, required medical examination.
During the medical evaluation, Whetherbee revealed that although he
had been diagnosed with bi-polar disorder, he was no longer taking the
medications his doctor prescribed for him to manage this disorder.
Whetherbee maintained that the medications were unnecessary because
he had not experienced any bi-polar episodes in a number of years. The
evidence further indicated that Wetherbee altered his medication
regimen against his medical provider's recommendation. Because the job
for which he was being considered required that he work on safetysensitive systems and equipment in its nuclear power plant, Southern
Company determined it could not safely hire him and rescinded the
conditional job offer. Following an earlier remand, the district court
found this decision to be job related and consistent with business
necessity.'51 Wetherbee appealed that decision, and the Eleventh

146. Id. at 829-31.
147. Id. at 831.
148. 754 F.3d 901 (11th Cir. 2014).
149. Id. at 903. The business-necessity affirmative defense is set forth in the language
of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). Under Title I of the ADA, it is generally an affirmative
defense to a claim of discrimination that an alleged application of qualification standards,
tests, or selection criteria that screens out, or tends to screen out, or otherwise denies a job
or benefit to an individual with a disability, is job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and the individual's job performance cannot be accomplished with reasonable
accommodation. Id.
150. Wetherbee, 754 F.3d at 905.
151. Id.

944

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Circuit affirmed the result reached below on other grounds.152 'The
only issue we need to address in this appeal, however, is whether a
claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3XC) requires a plaintiff to
prove he is disabled."1 5 3 The court joined other circuits in holding that
must demonstrate he is a qualified
an individual seeking relief
154
individual with a disability.

Russell v. City of Mobile Police Department'5 5 presented the court of
appeals another medical inquiry question. At issue in Russell was
whether an employee must demonstrate an actual injury to state a
cognizable improper medical inquiry claim.' 56 Russell sued the city,
alleging that one of the city's supervisory employees engaged in an
improper medical inquiry by questioning her about her fitness after she
fainted at work. After becoming upset during a workplace incident, the
plaintiff passed out on the job. She claimed the questioning by her public
safety employer that followed was a medical inquiry, which her employer
disputed.'57 She was unable to establish that her employer took any
adverse employment action against her after the incident.'58 The
plaintiff claimed her employer's actions exceeded the permissible scope
of such inquiries. 5 9 The court of appeals concluded that the district
court properly granted summary judgment for Russell's employer
because she failed to demonstrate she suffered any injury or damages as
a result of the alleged violation. 8 °
Immunity
Another ADA decision rendered during the survey period concerned
the scope of public employer immunity from such claims. In Lightfoot
v. Henry County School District,16' the court concluded that Georgia

F

152. Id.
153. Id. at 903.
154. Id. at 903-04. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits hold that an individual seeking
relief under § 12112(dX3)(C) must demonstrate that she is a qualified individual with a
disability. See O'Neal v. City of New Albany, 293 F.3d 998, 1010 n.2 (7th Cir. 2002) and
Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 960 n.4 (10th Cir. 2002).

155. 552 F. App'x 905 (11th Cir. 2014).
156. Id. at 906. Section 12112(dX4XA) of the ADA created a cause of action against
employers making improper medical inquiries. Id.

157. 552 F. App'x at 906-07.
158. Id. at 907.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 771 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2014).

20151

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

945

school districts and school boards are not entitled to Eleventh Amend162
ment immunity because they are not arms of the State of Georgia.
IV. SECTION 1983
Again this year, decisions defining the scopes of the free speech rights
of public employees and of public employer immunity from suit
dominated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1983' appeals decided by
the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period. The following decisions
on these and other issues are noteworthy.
Abandonment of Claim
Mosley v. Alabama Unified Judicial System 4 presented a panel
with the rather interesting question of whether a plaintiff abandons her
§ 1983 claims by failing to specifically mention them in her response to
a defendant's motion for summary judgment.165 Under the facts
specifically present in this appeal, the court concluded that the district
court erred in finding against the plaintiff on that basis. 166 The court
held that Mosley had not abandoned her § 1983 claims because the
defendants failed to sufficiently challenge the merits of those claims in
their motion for summary judgment.167 Concluding that the motion for
summary judgment below was not brought on all of the various claims
asserted by Mosely in her complaint, it was an error for the district court
to conclude that she abandoned those claims by not specifically
addressing them in169her response."' The case was remanded for
A.

further proceedings.

B. Equal Protection
Owens v. Jackson County Board of Education17 ° was an appeal by
a public employer who was denied summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds of a gender retaliation claim. 1 Relying upon
earlier precedent, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the district court

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 777.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
562 F. App'x 862 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 864.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 864-65.
Id at 864-66.
Id. at 870.
561 F. App'x 846 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 847.

946

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

erred by denying the board of education's Fourteenth Amendment17 2
'
'This Court has held that a claim of gender-based
immunity claim. 73
retaliation 'simply does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause."'"74
C. FirstAmendment
' cases, attempting to determine the proper
Two First Amendment 75
contours of the Supreme Court's holding in Garcetti v. Ceballos,'76 were
decided during the survey period. An appeal from the Eleventh Circuit,
Lane v. Franks,'77 afforded the United States Supreme Court an
opportunity to provide clarification. The Supreme Court found that the
First Amendment protected an Alabama community college worker from
retaliation for testifying against a former state legislator in a criminal
fraud trial. 7 ' In a unanimous decision, the Court reversed the
Eleventh Circuit, which had concluded the worker's testimony was part
of his official duties as a public employee and, as such, was not protected
speech. 7 9 In the same decision, however, the Court also held that the
college president who did the firing was nevertheless entitled to qualified
immunity from liability for that decision. 80 The Supreme Court
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit had simply read Garcetti too
broadly.18'
The decision in Franks is significant because it puts to rest the
strained assertion that a public employee who testifies in a judicial
proceeding about things learned during the course of his public
employment somehow automatically falls outside the scope of constitutional free speech protection.' 2 This decision takes away the categorical exception for testimony connected to the employee's job,"s which
the Eleventh Circuit seemed to be endorsing in its decision below.'"
Under the Eleventh Circuit's reading of Garcetti, which found that an
internal memorandum prepared by a prosecutor was unprotected

172. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV.
173. Owens, 561 F. App'x at 849.
174. Id. (quoting Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1997)).
175. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
176. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
177. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
178. Id. at 2380.
179. Id. at 2379-80.
180. Id. at 2381.
181. Id. at 2379.
182. Id. at 2383.
183. Id. at 2381-82.
184. See Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App'x 709, 712 (11th Cir. 2013)
(discussing why it considered the testimony to be official duty activity).
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employee speech, a public employee must be speaking as a private
citizen on a matter of public concern to be shielded by the First
If that were the case, then the inquiry shifts to
Amendment. 1'
whether the government employer had an adequate justification for its
treatment of the worker. 8 The Court's opinion appears to sharpen
the balance between a government employer's need to exercise control
over a public employee's words and actions, and the ability of its public
employees to shed light on government fraud and abuse without
suffering retribution for doing so.187 This is an important clarification
of existing law. The clarification strengthens a public whistleblower's
position to the extent that she is disclosing what she believes to be
fraud.
On remand, the Eleventh Circuit subsequently determined that Lane's
testimony fell within the scope of the Ex parte Young exception to the
Eleventh Amendment's' prohibition against civil actions against state
officials in their official capacity because Lane sought reinstatement to
his former position of employment. 8 9 The court then sent the case
back to the district court for subsequent proceedings consistent with its
ruling and that of the Supreme Court.9 0
In another high profile case, Brannon v. Finkelstein, 9' the Eleventh
Circuit reinstated a forensic psychologist's suit claiming he had been
blacklisted by the Broward County Public Defender after testifying in
favor of a Florida circuit court judge at an ethics hearing. 192 Brannon
claimed that Finkelstein reduced and ultimately terminated his forensic
consulting work for the public defender's office following his testimony.
Brannon's testimony was allegedly in opposition to the position
Finkelstein's deputies took in the proceeding. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Finkelstein, finding there was no causal
nexus between the testimony and subsequent changes Finkelstein made
in the method used by his office to assign work to consulting forensic
psychologists, including Brannon.19 Following a detailed analysis of

185. Id. at 711.
186. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2381.
187. See generally id.
188. U.S. CONST. amend XL.
189. Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty Coll., 772 F.3d 1349, 1351 (11th Cir. 2014). The Exparte
Young exception provides that official capacity suits against state officials are permissible

under the Eleventh Amendment when the plaintiff seeks prospective equitable relief to end
continuing violations of federal law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 165-67 (1908).
190. Lane, 772 F.3d at 1351-52.
191. 754 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2014).
192. Id. at 1272-73.
193. Id. at 1273-74.
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the evidence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a reasonable jury could
potentially194side with either party and vacated the grant of summary
judgment.
D. Class of One
A decision rendered during the survey period provides some clarity on
the proper application of the class-of-one concept in § 1983 actions. The
Supreme Court recognized the viability of this type of equal protection
claim by private citizens in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,195 and
explained its limited application to public employment in Engquist v.
OregonDepartmentofAgriculture:9 6 "When those who appear similarly
situated are nevertheless treated differently, the Equal Protection
Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference. " 197
In Brackin v. Anson, 9 ' the court affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the public employer on an attempted class-of-one claim.' 99 The
court of appeals held that public employees cannot state actionable classof-one claims against their public employers. °°
E. Immunity
Consistent with the holding in the ADA context reached in Lightfoot
2"' in Walker v. Jefferson County Board
v. Henry County School District,
of Education, °2 another published decision, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Alabama county school boards are neither arms nor alter
egos of the State of Alabama." 3 Thus, they did not enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity.2°4 In Walker, the court of appeals determined
that intervening changes in Alabama law did not alter its earlier
conclusion that Alabama school districts do not enjoy such immunity.2 °5 In a consolidated appeal, the school districts asked the Eleventh
Circuit to reevaluate its earlier decision 6 rendered in Stewart v.

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 1277-78.
528 U.S. 562, 564 -65 (2000).
553 U.S. 591 (2008).
Id. at 602.
585 F. App'x 991 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 996.

200. Id.
201. See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
202. 771 F.3d 748 (11th Cir. 2014).
203. Id. at 757.

204. Id.
205. Id. at 750.
206. Id.

20151

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

949

Baldwin County Board of Education.0 7 Following a thoughtful and
thorough analysis of the intervening developments in Alabama law, the
Eleventh Circuit declined the invitation and reaffirmed Stewart."'
V.

CONCLUSION

Employment law decisions rendered by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period continue to
provide practitioners with useful insight on this evolving area of the law,
as they have for over three decades. The authors thank the Mercer Law
Review for allowing us to comment on those decisions each year over
most of that time.

207. 908 F.2d 1499, 1511 (11th Cir. 1990).
208. Walker, 771 F.3d at 757.

